At the same time, the system allowed incoming groups to settle and cultivate land under local customary rules. These communities generally received rights of use rather than permanent ownership.

Two main forms of hakura existed: Administrative Hakura (Dar), which covered large tribal territories, and Privilege Hakura, smaller grants awarded to scholars, merchants, or officials.

Although largely unwritten, this customary system provided a relatively stable framework for managing relations between farming and pastoral communities for generations.

Following the British conquest of Darfur in 1916, colonial authorities introduced indirect rule, reorganizing tribal boundaries and strengthening positions such as nazir and omda. This transformed tribal affiliation into a formal administrative basis for access to land and authority.

After Sudan’s independence in 1956, power became increasingly centralized in Khartoum. A decisive turning point came with the 1970 Unregistered Land Act under President Jaafar Nimeiri. The law declared all unregistered land to be state property.

Because most land in Darfur was governed through customary rather than formal registration, vast areas were effectively transferred from local communities to the state.

This created a dual legal system: customary law retained local legitimacy, while state law granted the government power to reallocate land, fueling competition, insecurity, and political tension.

Although rain-fed farming and pastoralism employed much of the rural population, these sectors suffered from weak state support despite their productive potential.

In West Darfur particularly, the shortage of roads, healthcare, clean water, schools, and markets became a major source of grievance. During the first fifty years after independence, almost no paved roads were built within the region.

This prolonged neglect fostered widespread feelings of exclusion and helped drive the emergence of armed movements that viewed unequal development as evidence of political marginalization.

Weak development also intensified local conflict. With few alternative livelihoods, communities remained heavily dependent on scarce land, water, and grazing resources.

State weakness further worsened tensions. Rather than building effective institutions, authorities sometimes armed selected local groups as part of counterinsurgency strategies.

For many researchers and peacebuilders, sustainable development remains essential to long-term stability in Darfur.

In North Darfur, rainfall reportedly declined by more than 50 percent, leading to crop failure and mass livestock losses.

These environmental shocks triggered major migrations. Camel-herding groups from the arid north moved southward and westward toward more fertile areas such as Dar Masalit and the Jebel Marra region.

At the same time, Darfur’s population expanded rapidly—from approximately 1.3 million in 1973 to more than 6.4 million by 2003.

Population growth combined with shrinking fertile land placed increasing pressure on agricultural zones and grazing corridors.

The result was not automatic violence, but a sharp intensification of competition over already limited resources.

There were also traditional livestock migration routes known as Maraheel, which organized seasonal herd movement between northern and southern zones.

Over time, environmental stress and population growth pushed cultivation into marginal lands, blocking many of these routes.

Commercial farming of crops such as peanuts, sesame, and tobacco further expanded cultivated territory.

Meanwhile, state institutions proved unable to manage these transitions effectively.

Traditional mediation mechanisms such as Judiya, once used to resolve disputes, also weakened.

Without credible systems for resource management or conflict resolution, disagreements over land and water became more likely to escalate into violence.

The Masalit became known for resisting external domination, confronting both Mahdist authority and later French expansion from Chad.

Colonial administration reshaped local power through indirect rule and administrative boundary changes, weakening some traditional institutions.

In later decades, identities hardened politically. Communities such as the Masalit, Fur, and Dajo increasingly identified within the category of Zurga, in contrast to Arab groups settled in the region.

From the 1980s onward, environmental pressure, state weakness, and competition over resources intensified identity politics.

During the 1990s, new administrative reforms divided areas historically associated with Dar Masalit.

These changes contributed to violent clashes and foreshadowed the broader Darfur war that erupted in 2003.

Despite displacement and violence, many Masalit people continue to view their historical sultanate and the Hakura system as central to their legal and cultural claims to land.

As land became scarcer and institutions weaker, identity was increasingly used as a tool of mobilization within a deeper struggle over power and resources.

The violence witnessed in El Geneina and the Ardamata Camp in 2023 illustrates this trajectory clearly.

It was not an isolated eruption, but the result of decades of accumulated structural failures.

Understanding what happened in Ardamata and what continues to happen in Darfur requires moving beyond the simplistic notion of tribal conflict and recognizing a broader crisis at the intersection of land, state power, and development.